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LABOR SUPPLY SHOCKS, NATIVE WAGES, AND THE 
ADJUSTMENT OF LOCAL EMPLOYMENT∗
CHRISTIAN DUSTMANN
UTA SCHONBERG
JAN STUHLER
By exploiting a commuting policy that led to a sharp and unexpected inflow
of Czech workers to areas along the German-Czech border, we examine the impact
of an exogenous immigration-induced labor supply shock on local wages and em-
ployment of natives. On average, the supply shock leads to a moderate decline in
local native wages and a sharp decline in local native employment. These average
effects mask considerable heterogeneity across groups: while younger natives ex-
perience larger wage effects, employment responses are particularly pronounced
for older natives. This pattern is inconsistent with standardmodels of immigration
but can be accounted for by a model that allows for a larger labor supply elasticity
or a higher degree of wage rigidity for older than for young workers. We further
show that the employment response is almost entirely driven by diminished in-
flows of natives into work rather than outflows into other areas or nonemployment,
suggesting that “outsiders” shield “insiders” from the increased competition. JEL
Codes: J21, J22, J61, R23. Keywords: Immigration, wage effects, labor supply
elasticity, internal migration.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this article, we revisit the question of how immigra-
tion affects the wages and employment of native workers.1 We
exploit a policy that has been implemented 14 months after
the fall of the Berlin wall and which allowed Czech workers
to seek employment in eligible German border municipalities
but denied residence rights, thereby inducing daily commuting
across the border. This commuting policy resulted in an almost
ideal exogenous labor supply shock that was unexpected, sud-
den, and of considerable magnitude, averaging to about 10% of
local employment in municipalities closest to the border. The
∗Christian Dustmann acknowledges funding through the ERC Advanced
Grant 323992-DMEA and by the DFG (DU1024/1-1). Jan Stuhler acknowledges
funding from the German National Academic Foundation, the Spanish Ministry of
Economy and Competitiveness (MDM2014-0431 and ECO2014-55858-P), and the
Comunidad de Madrid (MadEco-CM S2015/HUM-3444).
1. Many papers address this question; see, e.g., Grossman (1982), Altonji
and Card (1991), Goldin (1994), Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1996, 1997), Card
(2001), Angrist and Kugler (2003), Borjas (1999, 2003), Manacorda, Manning, and
Wadsworth (2012), and Ottaviano and Peri (2012).
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commuting requirement created exogenous variation in the im-
pact intensity at a disaggregated geographic (i.e., municipal) level,
which differentiates our work from other studies that use an ex-
perimental design.2
A further distinguishing feature of our work is the exception-
ally high quality data we have available, which is of longitudi-
nal nature and covers the entire workforce. This allows analysis
not only of the short-term effects of native responses for detailed
groups of workers (e.g., young unskilled natives) but also of dif-
ferent types of employment adjustments. For example, although
native employment adjustments in response to an immigration-
induced supply shock are typically interpreted as outflows into
nonemployment, they could also result from fewer nonemployed
workers entering employment in the affected area.3 Similarly, ad-
justments in local employment need not only stem from move-
ments into and out of nonemployment; they could also be due
to geographic movements across local labor markets, a mecha-
nism found to be essential to explain the long-run effects of ad-
verse demand shocks in the United States (see Blanchard and
Katz 1992).4 To throw more light on these aspects, we provide
evidence on the magnitude of each type of response and show
how their relative importance varies across worker groups. Thus,
the combination of a highly informative policy, a clean identi-
fication strategy, and high-quality longitudinal data on poten-
tially affected workers allows us to produce a more complete
picture of the effects of labor supply shocks than what so far
reported.
Our empirical estimates show that the inflow of Czech work-
ers leads to a moderate decline in average local wages and a
2. See, e.g., Card (1990), Hunt (1992), Carrington and Lima (1996), Friedberg
(2001), Glitz (2012), Prantl and Spitz-Oener (2014) and Monras (2015a).
3. Cohen-Goldner and Paserman (2006) distinguish, like us, between the ef-
fect of immigration to Israel on inflows and outflows from employment using the
rotating panel feature of the Israeli labor force survey.
4. Blanchard and Katz (1992) find that U.S. states that experience an adverse
demand shock never fully recover in terms of employment, but that unemployment
and wages adjust because of workers moving out of affected states, or leave the
labor force (see Yagan 2016). Dao, Furceri, and Loungani (2014) find less net out-
migration in more recent periods, in particular in the year after the shock. In the
migration literature, the question of whether and to what extent an immigration-
induced labor supply shock may lead some of the existing workforce to relocate
remains controversial (see, e.g., Butcher and Card 1991; Filer 1992; Borjas, Free-
man, and Katz 1997; Card and DiNardo 2000; Card 2001; and Borjas 2003, 2006).
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sharp decline in local employment of natives. Three years into the
policy, a 1 percentage point increase in the overall employment
share of Czech workers had decreased local native wages by about
0.13 and local native employment by about 0.9%.5 Both responses
were remarkably rapid, with the wage response preceding the full
employment response. In light of the strong employment response,
it is not surprising that the public reaction to the commuting pol-
icy became less favorable, which eventually led to a tightening of
the policy.
As is the case for any immigration episode, our findings have
to be interpreted in light of the particular policy considered. There
are several reasons for why the inflow of immigrants may have
led to more adverse effects on natives in ours than in other situ-
ations. First, unlike in many other contexts, commuting workers
did not live and consume in the affected areas, thus reducing pos-
sible demand effects induced by immigrant consumption.6 Second,
it focuses on the short-term effects of an unexpected and excep-
tionally large labor supply shock, affecting a region that had not
experienced large immigrant inflows or labor supply shocks in the
recent past.7 Third, the labor supply shock may have been viewed
as temporary by firms, making them reluctant to expand capital
in response to the shock.
Our decomposition of the overall native employment re-
sponse into different types of adjustment sheds new insight to the
5. Glitz (2012) and Aydemir and Kirdar (2014), using quasi-natural experi-
ments, also find large employment effects, although their specification is not di-
rectly comparable to ours. Using a similar design to ours, Doran, Gelber, and Isen
(2015) conclude that the causal impact of extra H-1B visas crowds out employment
of other workers in the receiving firm.
6. Despite studying cases when immigrants live and consume in the affected
areas, most empirical papers address only the production side and do not investi-
gate the impact of immigrant consumption on native-born wages, although some
discuss this possibility. In an early paper, Greenwood and Hunt (1984) suggest
that immigration can increase aggregate demand, while Altonji and Card (1991)
and Borjas (2013) consider immigrant consumption in their model but not in their
empirical analysis. Hercowitz and Yashiv (2002) and Bodvarsson, van den Berg,
and Lewer (2008) use model-based approaches to reexamine mass migration to
Israel and the Miami boatlift, respectively, and conclude that demand effects may
delay or abate wage and employment effects on natives.
7. This distinguishes our border region from, e.g., the Miami labor market
analyzed in Card (1990), which had a long history of immigration (with a 35.5%
foreign born population). Card (1990) points out that as a result, the “industry
distribution in Miami in the late 1970s was well suited to handle an influx of un-
skilled immigrants,” with “textile and apparel industries particularly prominent”
(p. 256).
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interpretation of employment responses to immigration. First,
native employment decreases predominantly through reductions
in inflows into local employment, whereas outflows from the in-
cumbent native workforce are much smaller. This observation in-
dicates that “outsiders” (i.e., workers not employed in the affected
area) bear most of the burden of the labor supply shock and thus
shield “insiders” (i.e., workers employed in the affected area) from
the adverse effects of the shock. The shielding effect could arise
either because “outsiders” are particularly elastic in their employ-
ment response or “insiders” are, at least in the short run, protected
by partial wage rigidity and firing restrictions. Second, even in the
short run, roughly one-third of the local employment response re-
sults from geographic movement to and from employment in other
areas not affected by the labor supply shock, meaning that it does
not necessarily reflect a reduction in the national employment
level.
In terms of differential effects by skill, the inflow of Czech
workers leads to larger wage and employment declines for un-
skilled than skilled natives, which, given Czech workers’ lower
level of skills relative to German workers, is in line with the
standard immigration model. Breaking wage and employment re-
sponses further out by age group, our results reveal that among
skilled workers, natives under 30 suffer the largest wage decline,
whereas natives over 50 suffer the largest employment decline,
although most Czechs who entered the West German border area
weremiddle aged. This pattern (which we refer to as “perverse” ef-
fects) is inconsistentwith standardmodels of immigration but can,
aswe show, be accounted for by amodel that allows for a larger em-
ployment response (either due to a larger local labor supply elas-
ticity, or a higher degree of wage rigidity) for older than for young
workers. It underscores the need to analyze immigration-induced
wage and employment responses jointly, as isolated estimates of
wage or employment effects may misrepresent the overall impact
of immigration.8
8. Piyapromdee (2014) makes a related point by suggesting that a mainly
unskilled immigration shock to a particular area may be exacerbated in its effect
on unskilled natives if these are relatively immobile. Most papers in the literature
focus on wage responses only. Card (1990, 2001, 2007), Altonji and Card (1991),
Dustmann, Fabbri, and Preston (2005), Boustan, Fishback, and Kantor (2010),
Wagner (2010), and Glitz (2012) investigate wage and employment responses, but
not how these responses interact with each other.
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II. AN EQUILIBRIUM MODEL WITH HETEROGENEOUS LABOR SUPPLY
AND WAGE RIGIDITIES
To aid the interpretation of our empirical findings, we com-
mence by setting out a simple model that links immigration-
induced labor supply shifts to the employment andwage responses
of natives in the local labor market. We assume that (as it is the
case in our empirical application) the local labor market under
consideration is small relative to the national labor market. In
consequence, the change in equilibrium wages (and native em-
ployment) in other areas will be negligible even if natives respond
to the labor supply shock by moving away from affected areas. We
start out with a fully competitive labor market as a benchmark,
and allow for wage rigidities in a second step. One important dis-
tinguishing feature of our model relative to other models is that
we allow the labor supply responses of natives, or the degree of
wage rigidity, to vary across skill or other demographic groups.
II.A. Basic Set-up
1. Production. Supposing that output Q in a specific area
is produced by combining labor L and capital K according to a
Cobb-Douglas production function, then
Q= AKαL1−α.
Here, labor L is a CES aggregate of unskilled (U) and skilled (S)
labor Lg, g = U, S:
L=
[
θU L
β
U + θSLβS
] 1
β
,
where θU + θS = 1, and the elasticity of substitution between the
two skill groups equals σ = 11−β , with β  1.
Within each skill group g, natives (or incumbents, denoted
by LNg ) and immigrants (or entrants, denoted by L
I
g) are perfect
substitutes in production, so that Lg = LNg + LIg.9 Without loss of
9. We investigate below wage- and employment responses for different skill
groups to the overall labor supply shock induced by the commuting policy. This
means that in our estimation procedure, we do not allocate Czech workers to skill
groups based on their observed skills. Whether Czechs compete with natives in a
particular skill group (and therefore are substitutes for them) will be part of the
parameter that we estimate.
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 generality, we further assume that (as in our empirical setting) 
there are no immigrants in the base period.
2. Labor demand. Assuming that firms are price takers in
the labor, capital and product market and normalizing the price
of the output good to 1, firms choose labor and capital such that
marginal costs equal the marginal products of labor and capital:
logwg = log
[
(1− α) A
] + α [log K − log L]
+ log θg + (β − 1)
[
log Lg − log L
]
,(1a)
(1b) log r = logαA+ (α − 1)
[
log K − log L] .
Suppose that the local supply of capital depends on the rental
price of capital in the local labor market under consideration (r)
and on rental prices in other local markets (r’), K = h(r, r’), and let
λ denote the inverse of the local elasticity of capital with respect
to its price r (i.e., 1
λ
= ∂h
∂r
r
h).
In Online Appendix A.I, and following Dustmann, Frattini,
and Preston (2013), we derive the firm’s change in the demand
of native workers (net of immigrant workers) from skill group g,
d log LNg , to a total immigration-induced labor supply shock rela-
tive to native equilibrium employment in the base period (in head
counts), dI = dLILN , resulting in
d log LNg
dI
= ϕsg + (β − 1) sg′
(β − 1)ϕ
d logwg
dI
− (ϕ − (β − 1)) sg′
(β − 1)ϕ
× d logwg′
dI
− π
I
g
πNg
,(2)
where g′ denotes the other skill group, ϕ = − αλ1−α+λ is the slope of
the aggregate labor demand curve, πNg and π
I
g denote the share
of workers of skill group g (in head counts) among immigrants
and natives (i.e., πNg =
LNg
LNU+LNS
and π Ig =
LIg
LIU+LIS
), and sg denotes the
contribution of labor type g to the total labor aggregate (see Online
Appendix A.I for details).
Suppose that g indexes unskilled labor and g′ skilled labor
and that immigration is predominantly unskilled (i.e.,
π Ig
πNg
> 1).
Equation (2) first illustrates that in the absence of any wage
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response to immigration (i.e., d logwgdI =
d logwg′
dI = 0), unskilled na-
tive employment declines by the rate π
I
U
πNU
, the relative density of
immigrants to natives among unskilled workers. Equation (2) fur-
ther highlights that a decline in the wage of unskilled labor in
response to immigration (i.e., d logwUdI < 0) will dampen the employ-
ment response of the unskilled, as both the slope of the demand
curve ϕ and β − 1 are negative (i.e., ϕsg+(β−1)sg′(β−1)ϕ < 0). Further, the
impact of the overall immigration shock on skilled wages is am-
biguous (i.e.,d logwg′dI <> 0).
10 Similarly, the impact of an increase in
skilled wages on the demand for unskilled native labor is also
ambiguous (i.e., (ϕ−(β−1))sg′(β−1)ϕ <> 0), depending on the response of cap-
ital and the degree of substitutability between the different input
factors.
II.B. Equilibrium
1. Competitive Equilibrium with Fully Flexible Wage. In a
competitive equilibrium, quantities supplied must equal quanti-
ties demanded, and the intersection of the demand curve given
by equation (2) and the supply curve determine the skill-specific
and aggregate wages and employment in the local labor market.
Using Ng to denote the (fixed) number of natives who could poten-
tially supply labor to the local labor market, the local labor supply
function for skill group g is
(3) Lg = LIg + LNg = LIg + Ng fg(wg,w′g),
where immigrants (i.e., new entrants) are (as in Borjas 2013) as-
sumed to supply their labor inelastically, but the local labor supply
of natives (i.e., incumbents) depends on skill-specific wages in the
market under consideration (wg) and other local labor markets
(w
′
g). The local labor market elasticity for natives, which we al-
low to vary by skill group, is then given by ηg = ∂(Ng fg)∂wg
wg
Ng fg
. It
should be noted that this elasticity differs from the elasticities
typically estimated in the labor supply literature, which measure
the response of individuals to changes in net wages affecting the
10. There are two opposing forces: skilled wages decrease because of imperfect
elasticity of capital, but increase because of imperfect substitution between skilled
and unskilled workers.
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national labor market.11 We, in contrast, consider a manipulation
of local labor market conditions to which natives may respond
not only by moving into and out of nonemployment but also by
moving away from, or no longer moving into, the area.12 The lo-
cal labor supply elasticity therefore summarizes various potential
adjustment mechanisms, such as the internal migration of work-
ers between areas, or entries into and exits from the labor force.
These adjustment margins may have different importance for dif-
ferent types of workers and thus help explain why some groups re-
spondmore elastically than others. For instance, the employment-
to-unemployment transitions may be particularly important for
older workers entitled to generous unemployment and pension
benefits.
From the labor supply function (3), it follows that
(4) d logwg = 1
ηg
dlogLNg .
By substituting this expression (for both skill groups) into
equation (2) and rearranging, we derive the equilibrium employ-
ment response as (see Online Appendix A.II for details):
d log LNg =
ηg (β − 1)
[
π Ig
πNg
(
1− ϕηg′
) −  1− ϕ
β−1
)]
1− (β − 1)
[
ηg
(
1+ sgφ
) + ηg′
(
1+ sg′φ
) − ηgηg′ϕ
] dI.
(5)
Because β  1, and φ = ϕ
β−1 − 1, the denominator in (5) will
always be positive. The numerator is the difference between
the relative density of immigrants to natives in skill group
g,
π Ig
πNg
and the (weighted) average of these densities in the
different skill groups,  = sU π
I
U
πNU
+ sS π
I
S
πNS
, both weighted by ex-
pressions that depend on the elasticity of capital supply
(ϕ) and the supply elasticity of the other labor type (ηg′).
Thus, when β < 1, the impact of a supply shock on native
11. See, e.g., MaCurdy (1981) and Chetty et al. (2011) who estimate the labor
supply elasticity at the intensive margin or Blundell, Bozio, and Laroque (2013)
who estimate the elasticity at the extensive margin.
12. Heterogeneity in geographical mobility may have different reasons. For
instance, Notowidigdo (2013) shows that labor demand shocks may lead to differ-
ential mobility responses for low and high skilled workers because they lead to
changes in house prices and transfer payments.
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employment will be negative for skill group g if the weighted
intensity of immigration in that skill group (first term in brack-
ets) exceeds an appropriately weighted average of immigration
intensity across all skill groups (second term in brackets).
In the standard case of a homogenous local labor supply elas-
ticity (i.e., ηU = ηS = η), equations (4) and (5) imply that both the
wages and the employment of the skill group that experiences the
larger migration-induced supply shock (i.e., the group for which
π Ig
πNg
> ) will decline relative to the wages and employment of
the other group. These implications also hold for more general
production functions than equation (1), such as functions that
distinguish many skill groups (see, e.g., Dustmann, Frattini, and
Preston 2013) or allow for a third nest within skill groups (see,
e.g., Card and Lemieux 2001; Borjas 2003).
If, in contrast, the local labor supply elasticity varies across
groups, then the wages of the skill group for which immigration is
relatively intensive may increase relative to the other skill group,
as can be shown by considering the relative wage effects:
d logwS − d logwU =
(β − 1)
[
π IS
πNS
(1− ϕηU )− π
I
U
πNU
(1− ϕηS)
]
1− (β − 1) [ηS(1+ sSφ)+ ηU (1+ sUφ)− ηUηSϕ
] dI.(6)
Supposing that migration is predominantly unskilled (i.e., π
I
S
πNS
<
π IU
πNU
) and that the local labor supply of the unskilled is elastic rel-
ative to that of the skilled (i.e., ηU is large relative to ηS), then
the relative employment effect is amplified and the relative wage
effect muted compared to the case of a homogenous local labor
supply elasticity. Provided that capital is not fully elastic (ϕ < 0)
and some skilled migrants enter the local labor market (π IS > 0),
the wages of the unskilled may even increase relative to those
of the skilled. At the same time, employment of the unskilled
will strongly decline relative to that of skilled natives. Thus, in
these “perverse” cases, relative wage and employment effects have
the opposite signs. This observation emphasizes the need to in-
vestigate immigration-induced wage and employment responses
jointly to avoid a misleading picture of immigration’s overall la-
bor market effects. It should further be noted that in the case
of two skill groups, such an effect will only be observable when
capital is not perfectly elastic; that is, ϕ < 0. If an additional skill
group is added, perverse effects can occur even when the capital
supply is fully elastic (see Online Appendix A.III).
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2. Wage Rigidities. Our analysis so far assumes that wages
are fully flexible. However, in reality wages may, at least in the
short run, be partially downward rigid, and the degree of wage
rigidity may vary across skill groups (see, e.g., Card, Kramarz,
and Lemieux 1999). For instance, skilled workers may be more
likely to be covered by long-term contracts than unskilledworkers,
preventing firms from immediately cutting skilled wages.13 Next,
we allow for partially rigid wages, and further allow the degree of
wage rigidity to be different for skilled and unskilled workers.
Let d logwg denote the wage change, constrained by la-
bor market institutions or private contractual arrangements, by
which wages for skill group g may decline at most. The smaller (in
absolute terms) d logwg, the more rigid wages are. Provided that
wages cannot fall by as much as the equilibrium wage response
given by equations (4) and (5) for both skill groups, the economy is
demand-side constrained and there will be an abundance of native
workers who would like to work for the current wage rate, but can-
not find a job, and the employment response of natives is given by
equation (2) where wage responses d logwg are determined exoge-
nously by the degree of wage rigidity d logwg.
Heterogeneity in the degree of wage rigidity provides, in addi-
tion to heterogeneity in labor supply responses, an explanation for
“perverse” effects in which the group that experiences the great-
est shock needs not be the group that suffers the largest wage or
employment decline.14
III. BACKGROUND AND DATA
III.A. Commuter Policy
Our analysis takes advantage of a commuting policy
(Grenzga¨ngerregelung), triggered by the fall of the Iron Curtain
and implemented by the German government in 1991, that al-
lowed workers from the neighboring Czech Republic to seek em-
ployment inGerman districts along theGerman-Czech border (see
13. Angrist and Kugler (2003) point out that labor market rigidities, while
protecting some native workers from immigrant competition, can increase neg-
ative employment effects. They provide evidence that migration creates higher
employment responses in countries with more rigid institutions.
14. Wages of skilled workers are more downward rigid than those of unskilled
workers if d logwsd logws <
d logwu
d logwu
, where d logwg is the equilibrium wage response in the
case of fully flexible wages given by equations (4) and (5).
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also Moritz 2011 who was the first to investigate the labor market
effects of that policy). Although allowed to work in Germany, these
workers were not granted residence, forcing them to commute on
a daily basis between their home country and their workplace
in Germany, an aspect that our empirical analysis exploits (see
Section IV.B).15 The policy was otherwise nonrestrictive. Work
permits were formally granted for up to two years and could be
renewed after that.16
This particular commuting scheme was part of a larger
scheme for the legal employment of foreign nationals in Germany
announced in September 1990 and implemented on January 1,
1991, one year after the fall of the Berlin wall. The intention of
the scheme’s various provisions was to facilitate the recruitment
of foreign workers in a time of increased labor demand follow-
ing German reunification.17 For example, a similar commuting
scheme applied to Germany’s second Eastern neighbor, Poland,
and nondiscriminately covered all German districts sharing a bor-
der with either Poland or the Czech Republic. The overall policy
set up ensures that the commuting scheme examined here was
exogenous to the economic conditions in the areas covered. We
provide more details on the policy in Online Appendix B.
Figure I maps the region affected by the scheme, which com-
prises 21 districts within an approximate 80 kilometer band from
the Czech-German border. Some of these districts, however, are
close to the former East and West German border and may thus
have been affected after the 1990 reunification by commuters from
East Germany, where wages were lower. Hence, to avoid any
contamination of our experiment, we exclude districts located
within approximately 80 kilometers of the former East and
West German border (although our results remain robust to less
15. The requirement to commute was enforced via various channels. First,
workers that entered employment under the commuting scheme had to apply for
a special type of permit, the Grenzga¨ngerkarte, which reflected the worker’s con-
ditional residence status. Second, in line with the German requirement that all
residents register with the local registry office, a double registration was required
by which both tenants and landlords had to submit information, making it impos-
sible for Czech commuters to legally rent a home in Germany.
16. Commuting requirements play also a central role in Angrist (1996) and
Mansour (2010) who study the labor market response to exogenous changes in
the commuting pattern of Palestinian day workers during the First and Second
Intifada.
17. See “Anwerbestoppausnahme-Verordnung” (1990), Bundesgesetzblatt,
Jahrgang 1990, Teil I.
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FIGURE I
Border Region
The map shows districts eligible under the commuting policy (medium gray
and dark gray), matched inland control districts (light gray), and other districts
in West (white) and former East (gray) Germany. Eligible districts close to the
inner German border (dark gray) are dropped in the analysis. The map also shows
crossings along and cities near the Czech-German border.
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TABLE I
CHARACTERISTICS OF TREATED, INLAND AND MATCHED CONTROL DISTRICTS IN 1989
West Control
Border Germany districts
Skill
Low (no postsecondary education) 0.274 0.229 0.244
Medium (apprenticeship or equivalent) 0.695 0.703 0.723
High (university or college) 0.030 0.069 0.034
Age
Below 30 0.434 0.351 0.420
30 to 49 0.410 0.454 0.412
50 and above 0.157 0.195 0.168
Female 0.411 0.401 0.414
Foreign 0.025 0.081 0.035
Mean log wages (censored) 3.881 4.055 3.879
Share censored 0.023 0.048 0.027
No. districts 13 327 24
No. workers 335,042 21,173,830 726,536
Note. The table compares average characteristics (weighted by employment level) of workers in eligible
districts in the border region, in all otherWest-German districts and in matched control districts (see Figure I)
in 1989, one year prior to the immigration-induced labor supply shock. The wage variable refers to the average
wage earned per day of the employment relationship and is right-censored at the social security limit.
Data Source: German Social Security Data, 1989.
conservative choices). As Figure I shows, this exclusion leaves a
rural region of 13 districts, or 291 municipalities, referred to here-
after as the “border region,” which contains various small but no
large cities. As Table I illustrates, its local labor market at that
time was characterized by a comparatively small share of highly
skilled workers with university degrees, a young workforce, low
wages, and a low share of preexisting immigrants.
The introduction of the commuting scheme in January 1991
led to a substantial and rapid inflow of Czech workers into
the border region, whose employment shares in border and se-
lected control districts (defined in Section IV.B) are plotted in
Figure II. By June 1992, the share of Czech nationals in the border
region had increased from close to zero to about 3% and on average
to about 10% in municipalities closest to the border. The employ-
ment share of Czech nationals in control districts, in contrast,
being unaffected by the commuting scheme, remained negligible.
As Figure II also shows, the share of Czech workers remained
stable from 1992 to 1993 and decreased thereafter, partly because
of a stricter interpretation of the commuting scheme in later years,
which was caused by allegations that the large Czech inflows into
13
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FIGURE II
Employment Shares of Czech nationals: Border vs Inland
The figure plots the share of Czech workers in local employment in the border
region and in matched control districts (see Figure I) before and after the commut-
ing policy came into effect in 1991. Data Source: German Social Security Records,
eligible border region and matched control districts, 1986 to 2000.
the border region had led to a worsening of conditions for native
workers. Hence, in the empirical analysis, we focus on the imme-
diate wage and employment effects of the labor supply shock up
until 1993 because the “reverse experiment” of subsequent decline
in the share of Czech nationals from 1994, albeit interesting, is
potentially endogenous to local labor market conditions.
Table II provides descriptive statistics for both the existing
stock of workers in the border region in 1989 (i.e., before the en-
try of workers from the Czech Republic) and for Czech nation-
als, with their characteristics as of 1992. According to the ta-
ble, Czech workers were far more likely to be unskilled (i.e., had
no post-secondary degree) than the existing workforce (50.5% vs
27.6%) and more likely to fall into the 30 to 49 age group (61.9%
vs 40.8%), with a much lower share of workers over 50 (3.7% vs
15.7%). The Czech nationals were also predominantlymale, and in
terms of concentration, overrepresented in construction, the hotel
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TABLE II
CHARACTERISTICS OF CZECH AND NON-CZECH NATIONALS IN THE BORDER REGION
Non-Czech Czech
Panel A: Non-Czechs vs Czechs (1989) (1992)
Skill distribution
Unskilled (no postsecondary education) 0.276 0.505
Skilled (apprenticeship or equivalent, university) 0.724 0.495
Age distribution
Below 30 0.435 0.344
30–49 0.408 0.619
50 and above 0.157 0.037
Age distribution: unskilled
Below 30 0.500 0.370
30–49 0.290 0.593
50 and above 0.209 0.037
Age distribution: skilled
Below 30 0.410 0.317
30–49 0.453 0.646
50 and above 0.137 0.037
Share female 0.411 0.163
Industries
Public sector 0.171 0.021
Pit and quarry 0.027 0.048
Wood processing 0.032 0.074
Construction 0.099 0.249
Hotels and restaurants 0.031 0.092
No. workers 332,785 9,996
Panel B: Relative Wage Gap Czechs vs Non-Czechs (1992)
Coeff. S.E.
(i) Municipality fixed effects −0.302 (0.003)
(ii) Occupation × firm fixed effects −0.214 (0.006)
(iii) Occupation × firm × tenure fixed effects −0.136 (0.006)
No. workers 267,756
Note. Panel a compares the characteristics of Czech commuters (in 1992) against the preexisting, non-Czech
workforce (in 1989). Panel b reports the log-wage gap between Czech and Non-Czech workers in the border
region in 1992. The wage variable refers to the average wage earned per day of the employment relationship
and is right-censored at the social security limit. Following Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Schoenberg (2009),
we impute wages under the assumption that the error term is normally distributed while allowing for a
different residual variance by gender as well as by district. All regressions control for age, age squared, sex,
and education (distinguishing between 3 education groups). Row (i) additionally controls for municipality
fixed effects. Row (ii) further adds 3-digit occupation × firm fixed effects, while Row (iii) controls for 3-digit
occupation × firm × tenure fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Data Source: German Social Security Records, eligible border region, 1989 and 1992.
and restaurant industry, and wood processing and manufactur-
ing, and underrepresented in the public sector. On average, Czech
nationals earned 0.302 log points lower wages than natives,
conditional on age, sex, and education (row (i) of Panel B). The
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wage gap between Czech and German nationals declines within
detailed occupation and firm groups (0.214; row (ii)) and reduces
further if the Czech and native worker were hired in the same year
(0.136; row (iii)). This remaining difference in wages may be due
to Czechs’ marginal productivity being lower than that of natives,
due to, for example, lower returns to unobserved characteristics
such as experience accumulated at home or lack in language pro-
ficiency.
III.B. Data
Our data come from over two decades of German Social Se-
curity Records (from 1980 to 2001), which include all men and
women covered by the social security system, excluding civil ser-
vants, the self-employed, and military personnel.18 Three char-
acteristics make this data set well suited for our analysis. First,
the large sample size allows us to obtain fairly precise estimates
of immigration on wages and employment even for detailed sub-
groups, although only a relatively small local area is affected by
immigrant inflows. Second, the longitudinality of the data allows
us to investigate whether the employment effects are driven by
an increased outflow of workers into other areas or non- or un-
employment, or by a decreased inflow of workers into the local
labor market, a dynamic so far underexplored in the literature.
Third, in addition to information on education, age, and other
individual characteristics, the data include the citizenship of ev-
ery employed individual, which allows identification of all Czech
workers working in Germany but living in the Czech Republic. As
a result, in our analysis, sampling error in the migration-induced
supply shock, which attenuates estimates of its impact on na-
tive labor market outcomes (Aydemir and Borjas 2011), is close to
zero.
Because our data set is constructed to observe each individ-
ual as of June 30 each year, each individual’s employment status
also refers to this date. The wage variable, in contrast, records the
average daily wage in the employment spell that contains the ref-
erence date.19 As is typically the case with social security data, our
18. In 2001, 77.2% of all workers in the German economy were covered by
social security and are hence recorded in the data (Federal Employment Agency,
2004).
19. Because employers are required to update records only at the end of each
year, this variable may also capture wage changes that occurred from June 30 to
December of the same year.
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wage variable is right-censored at the social security limit, which
in our sample affects only about 3% of all observations. Following
Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Scho¨nberg (2009), we impute censored
wages under the assumption that the error term is normally dis-
tributed while allowing for a different residual variance by gender
as well as by district. Information on districts or municipalities in
our data refer to the individual’s place of work and not her place
of residence.
We distinguish two skill groups: unskilled workers who en-
ter the labor market without postsecondary education and skilled
workers who have completed an apprenticeship scheme or equiv-
alent or graduated from a university.20 This classification is
particularly meaningful in the German context in which many
apprenticeship jobs educate for professions that require college
degrees in Anglo-Saxon countries (e.g., medical assistant or bank
clerk). We do not report separate results for university gradu-
ates because their share in the border region in 1990 was less
than 5%. Within each of these skill groups, we also distinguish
three age groups: younger than 30, 30 to 49, and 50 and older.
We further restrict the analysis to individuals aged between 18
and 65 and exclude irregular, marginal, and seasonal employ-
ment, as well as individuals undergoing apprenticeship train-
ing whose wages may not reflect their productivity. Our anal-
ysis of employment effects is thus based on regular full- and
part-time workers, with part-time work (>30 hours per week)
down-weighted into full-time equivalent units by 0.67 (18–30
hours) or 0.5 (<18 hours). Our wage analysis is based on full-time
employees only.
IV. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
In this section, we first explain how our main regression
equations relate to the theoretical model presented in Sec-
tion II and then describe our procedures for estimation and
identification.
20. To improve the consistency of the education variable in our data set, we
impute missing values using past and future values of the education variable (see
Fitzenberger, Osikominu, and Vo¨lter 2006). The imputed education variable is
missing for 3.9% of observations in the overall data, and 2% of sampled observa-
tions in the border region. We classify these individuals as unskilled, although
doing so has little impact on our findings.
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IV.A. Effect of Immigration on Wages and Employment
Corresponding to our theoretical setup, our basic estimation
equation regresses the change in log wages of natives (N) in skill
group g, age group s, and area j between two periods, t and k,
lnwgs, j , or the percentage change in native local employment,
LNgs, j , on the total inflow of Czech workers between 1990 and
1992 as a share of total employment in that area in 1990,C92−90j :
(7) lnwgs, j = αgs + βgsC92−90j + ugs, j
and
(8) LNgs, j = γgs + δgsC92−90j + vgs, j,
where
C92−90j =
LCzechj92 − LCzechj90
LNj90 + Lforeignj90
and LNgs, j =
LNgs, jt − LNgs, jk
LNgs, jk
.
Equations (7) and (8) are written in first differences to elimi-
nate time-constant area, skill and age group fixed effects while
allowing for skill and age group-specific growth rates in wages
and employment, αgs and γgs. The parameters of interest are βgs
and δgs, which measure the impact of the total inflow of Czech
workers between 1990 and 1992 on the percent change in wages
and employment of native workers in skill group gs in area j be-
tween the two time periods (specified in Section IV.B below).21
If wages are fully flexible, these parameters correspond to the
expressions derived in equations (4) and (5). If wages are par-
tially rigid, the wage response βgs is determined exogenously by
the degree of rigidity (see Section II.B) and the employment re-
sponse δgs is given by equation (2), Section II.A. It should be
noted that in contrast to the change in the local employment-
to-population ratio used in many extant studies (see, e.g., Altonji
and Card 1991; Dustmann, Fabbri, and Preston 2005; Boustan,
21. We scale the inflow of Czechs between 1990 and 1992 by total (including
foreign) employment in 1990, as the supply shock may displace not only native
but also pre-shock foreign workers. This choice has little consequences for our
estimates as the share of foreign workers was small in 1990. It ensures that the
coefficient δgs will be equal to −1 under full displacement, where every Czech
worker displaces either a native or foreign resident worker in proportion to the
employment share of each group.
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Fishback, and Kantor 2010; Smith 2012), the employment re-
sponse in equation (8) captures, in line with our theoretical set up,
employment movements across areas in addition to movements
from and to un- or nonemployment—which may be one reason
why we detect larger employment responses than typically esti-
mated in the literature.22
The coefficients βgs and δgs identify the total wage and em-
ployment effect of immigration, taking into account the indirect
effects of immigration through complementarities across skill and
age cells and across capital and labor, and answer the question:
“What is the overall effect of immigration on (local) wages and em-
ployment of a particular native skill-age group.”23 They conceptu-
ally differ from and are not comparable to the direct partial effects
of immigration by experience estimated by the national skill-cell
approach pioneered by Borjas (2003), or the direct partial effects of
immigration by education estimated by studies exploiting spatial
variation in the education- (or occupation-) specific immigration
shock (e.g., Card 2001, 2009; Glitz 2012).
Specifications (7) and (8) are consistent with our
experiment—because only the total but not the group-specific in-
flow of Czechs into the border region can be considered quasi-
random. They have the added advantage that identification of βgs
and δgs does not require the pre-allocation of immigrants to skill
groups based on their observable characteristics, thus avoiding
the problem of misclassification that arises when such observable
characteristics are used to assign immigrants into skill groups in
which they do not compete with natives.24
22. Moreover, whereas we measure the shock as the ratio of employed Czechs
and employment in the base period, the literature typically measures the ratio
of all incoming immigrants and the resident population in the base period (e.g.,
Card 2001, 2009; Boustan, Fishback, and Kantor 2010), or alternatively as the
change in the immigrant share in the population (e.g., Altonji and Card 1991;
Dustmann, Fabri, and Preston 2005; Dustmann, Frattini, and Preston 2013). The
slope coefficient in the latter specifications will—if the employment rates of re-
cent immigrants and natives differ—be different from −1 even if every immigrant
who finds a job displaces a resident worker. In contrast, our specification mea-
sures the extent to which immigrants crowd out native employment irrespective
of immigrants’ willingness or ability to find a job.
23. Examples of studies identifying the total effects of immigration include
Altonji and Card (1991), Dustmann, Fabbri, and Preston (2005), Saiz (2007), Bous-
tan, Fishback, and Kantor (2010), Dustmann, Frattini, and Preston (2013), and
Dustmann, Frattini, and Rosso (2015).
24. Dustmann and Preston (2012) illustrate that assigning immigrants to skill
groups based on observed characteristics may lead to serious misclassification
because immigrants often downgrade upon arrival.
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FIGURE III
Spatial Distribution of Czech Commuters in Border Region
The figure plots, for each municipality within the border region, the increase
in the number of Czech workers as a share of employment in 1990 against the
airline distance of the centroid of the municipality to the closest border crossing.
The size of each circle is proportional to employment in 1990. Fitted values are
from a regression on distance and distance squared. Data Source: German Social
Security Records, border region, 1990 and 1992.
IV.B. Estimation and Identification
1. Exploiting Distance to Border. One option to estimate
the effect of the immigration-induced labor supply shock on na-
tive workers’ wages (equation [7]) and employment (equation [8])
would be to compare the entire border region eligible under the
commuting policy with suitable control areas that were similar
in observable characteristics but not eligible. However, the na-
ture of the commuting experiment provides additional variation
in the exposure of different areas to Czech inflows that can be
usefully exploited: because Czech workers were forced to com-
mute daily, increased traveling costs exposed municipalities close
to the border more to the policy. In fact, as demonstrated in
Section V.A, distance to the border was a key determinant of
where Czech workers located within the border region, explain-
ing 38.7% of the overall variation in the Czech employment share
across municipalities (see also Figure III and Table III). We could
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TABLE III
FIRST STAGE: THE INFLOW OF CZECH COMMUTERS AND DISTANCE TO BORDER
Including matched
Border region only control districts
Distance (×100) −0.338 −0.338
(0.095) (0.092)
Distance (×100) squared 0.268 0.268
(0.113) (0.110)
Constant (border region) 0.115 0.114
(0.017) (0.016)
Constant (inland) 0.0011
(0.0003)
No. municipalities 291 1,550
R2 0.387 0.544
F 42.58 52.70
Note. The table reports the coefficients from the first stage regression of the inflow of Czech workers into the
municipality, measured as the increase in the number of Czech workers between 1990 and 1992 as a share of
local employment in 1990, on airline distance and distance squared to the next border crossing. Regressions
are estimated at the municipality level, weighted by local employment in 1990. In the first column, the
sample is restricted to the border region. The second column additionally includes matched control districts,
and distance and distance squared is interacted with an indicator variable equal to 1 if the municipality is
part of the border region. Standard errors are clustered on the district level.
Data Source: German Social Security Records, border region and matched control districts, 1990 and 1992.
therefore also estimate equations (7) and (8) only for municipal-
ities within the affected border region, using distance from the
border region as an instrument. In our baseline specification, we
combine the two approaches by pooling municipalities in the bor-
der region with unexposed control districts, thus exploiting varia-
tion in the employment share of Czechswithin the border region in
addition to using areas further inland as control units. To test the
robustness of our findings we also report separate estimates based
on the other two approaches, showing that all three approaches
produce similar results (see Table V).
2. Assumptions. For distance to border to be a valid in-
strument, the following assumptions need to hold. First, and
most important, in the absence of a Czech inflow, the evolution
of subgroup-specific local wages and employment must be un-
correlated with distance from the border. We provide support
for this assumption in Online Appendix D.I and Table O.I, by
analyzing whether prior to the introduction of the commuting
policies, municipalities in the border region closer to the border ex-
perienced differential trends in subgroup-specific outcomes from
municipalities further away from the border. Reassuringly, the
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table shows that distance to border is, with one exception, un-
correlated with prepolicy trends in outcomes. Nevertheless, to
make sure that our results are not driven by differential pre-
existing trends, we report results with and without controls for
municipality-specific time trends. We further estimate placebo re-
gressions in prepolicy periods and adopt an event study approach
(for some outcomes) to illustrate graphically that distance to bor-
der affects native local wage and employment growth only after
the inflow of Czech workers actually occurred.
In addition, for βgs and δgs in equations (7) and (8) to corre-
spond to their theoretical counterparts in equations (4) and (5),
“control” areas—that is, municipalities in matched inland dis-
tricts and municipalities at the edge of the border region that
received barely any Czech commuters—must not be affected by
the Czech inflow into “treated” areas near the border. This condi-
tion would be violated if natives from the treated municipalities
moved to control areas in response to the Czech inflow, thereby
increasing employment and lowering wages in these areas. Be-
cause the labor supply shock to the border region was negligible
in national terms, matched control areas that are not close to the
border region are clearly unaffected by this shock. As a robustness
check, we therefore compare the region very close to the Czech-
German border with a set of control districts located sufficiently
far from the border, thereby discarding any variation in Czech in-
flow within the border region. We implement such a comparison
using a synthetic control method (detailed in Online Appendix C)
that compares a single treatment to a weighted average of avail-
able control units (see Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller 2010).
This approach yields wage and employment effects that are simi-
lar to our baseline specification.
Finally, we need to rule out that the opening of the Czech-
West German border directly affected areas close to the border,
other than through the increased inflow of Czech workers into
those areas. One channel through which the opening of the bor-
der could affect areas close to the border is increased trade be-
tween the border region and the Czech Republic or increased for-
eign direct investment (FDI) by firms in the border region in the
Czech Republic. An alternative channel could be increasedmarket
access: areas close to the border may benefit from the opening of
the border by occupying a more central position within Germany
and Europe. We believe that both channels are unlikely, for two
main reasons. First, in 1993 (the last year in our main empirical
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analysis), some trade restrictions between Germany and the
Czech Republic were still in place and the trade volume between
the two countries amounted only to around 1% of the German
total. Similarly, throughout the mid-1990s, German FDI in the
Czech Republic was relatively small in magnitude (around 1.9
billion dollars over the period 1990–1996) and concentrated in the
capital Prague, rather than in areas close to the German border.
In addition, as shown by Redding and Sturm (2008), gains from
trade take a long time to materialize, whereas we focus on short-
term effects in the immediate aftermath of the border opening.
Second, such shocks, if present, would be likely to affect the bor-
der region as a whole, but when we drop control districts further
inland from our sample and exploit variation in Czech inflows
within the border region only, our estimates are very similar.
3. Selecting Control Areas. The matching of control areas is
based on variance-weighted differences in the employment share
of the education groups, the employment share of foreign nation-
als, mean log wages, the share of right-censored wage observa-
tions, local employment levels, and the employment shares of
four age groups in 1989 (the year before reunification and the
fall of the Iron Curtain). We consider only West German districts
of similar urban density, and we do notmatch on preexisting time
trends. The 24 matched control districts (corresponding to 1,259
control municipalities) depicted in Figure I are muchmore similar
to border districts than other West German districts (see column
(3) of Table I).25 Our baseline specification thus refers to 1,550
municipalities (291 in the border region and 1,259 control munic-
ipalities). The exact number varies slightly across subgroups and
years, as there are some small municipalities that do not employ
workers of a specific type or in a specific year.
In contrast, when using the synthetic control approach, which
discards all variation across municipalities within the border re-
gion, we match similarly on the education, foreign and age shares,
but also on outcome variables from 1986 to 1989 (cf. Abadie,
Diamond, and Hainmueller 2010). In these estimates, therefore,
we explicitly match on preexisting time trends (see Online Ap-
pendix C for details).
25. Three out of the 24 matched control districts are located next to the bor-
der region. Our findings are very similar if we exclude these neighboring control
districts from the sample.
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4. Timing and Placebo Tests. When estimating equations (7)
and (8), we adopt a flexible specification that allows us to assess
how quickly local wages and employment adjust in response to
the labor supply shock. Although the regressor C92−90j is always
defined as the inflow of Czech workers into area j between 1990
and 1992 as a share of local employment, we estimate annual re-
gressions of wage or employment changes between the years t and
t-1 on C92−90j , instrumented with distance to border. To obtain
the overall impact of the labor supply shock over longer periods,
we then sum the respective coefficient estimates for t= 1991 to t=
1993.26 Running yearly rather than long difference regressions is
not only informative about the timing of adjustment but allows us
to address potential selectivity bias in wage estimates, as the em-
ployment response to a labor supply shock may differ across the
wage distribution (see Bratsberg and Raaum 2012 and Llull 2013,
for a discussion). To deal with selection, we restrict in the wage
analysis the sample to individuals who are employed in the mu-
nicipality in both t and t-1, thus keeping the composition of work-
ers constant over the two time periods. As illustrated below, we
find that if instead longer differences are estimated on data that
discard longitudinal worker information, selective employment
response does indeed lead to underestimation of the wage effects.
We also estimate equations (7) and (8) for the years prior to
1990, when the later inflow of Czech nationals should have no im-
pact on native employment changes. Formulating the hypotheses
H0 : βgs = 0 and H0 : δgs = 0 for t  1990 provides a placebo setup
against which to probe the identifying assumption that areas lo-
cated close to the border experienced the same time trends prior to
1990 as areas located further away. Since we did not match on pre-
existing trends when selecting control districts, these estimates
provide a valid falsification test.27
Since our estimation strategy proceeds in multiple stages,
which makes the computation of analytical standard errors com-
plicated, we bootstrap standard errors using the wild-bootstrap
26. We implement the IV estimator in two steps: a first stage estimation at the
municipality level, regressing C92−90j on distance to border and its square and
weighting each observation by total employment in the municipality in 1990; and
a second stage regression of subgroup-specific native employment and wages in
themunicipality on the predicted inflow of Czechs,Cˆ92−90j ,with each observation
weighted by subgroup-specific employment in t-1.
27. Angrist and Krueger (1999) implement a similar test, illustrating that the
estimated effect of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami labor market is sensitive to
differences in trends between treatment and control units.
24
procedure and 500 repetitions (see Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller
2008). While our analysis is performed at the municipality level,
we cluster standard errors at the district level. For our main out-
comes of aggregate and skill-specific local wage and employment
effects of natives, we additionally report standard errors based
on the Spatial Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consis-
tent (SHAC) variance estimator proposed by Conley (1999) and
adopted by for example Kline and Moretti (2014), which allows
for correlation between areas that are geographically close but be-
long to different administrative units (see column (5) in Table V).28
The standard errors are very similar to our baseline bootstrapped
standard errors which allow for clustering at the district level.
V. RESULTS
V.A. First Stage: Distance to Border and Location of Czechs
In Figure III, we plot Czech employment growth from 1990
to 1992, C92−90j , in municipalities within the border region
against the municipality’s distance to the closest border cross-
ing, Zj, weighting municipalities according to 1990 employment
levels. As the figure illustrates, distance to border is indeed a
key determinant of where Czech nationals located within the bor-
der region: municipalities next to the border received the largest
inflow of Czech workers, corresponding on average to almost
10% of employment in 1990. Municipalities located more than
50 kilometers away from the border, in contrast, experienced
hardly any inflow.
We report the corresponding regression results (the first
stage), approximating the relationship between the inflow of
Czech nationals and distance to border as a quadratic function,
in Table III, reporting results for the border region only in col-
umn (2) and for the estimation sample including matched control
districts in column (3). The coefficients on distance and distance
squared are jointly highly significant (F = 42.58) and together
explain 38.7% of the variation in the Czech employment share
28. There are various difficulties in applying this procedure to our context
since, in contrast to Kline and Moretti (2014), our estimation strategy proceeds
in multiple stages. We have implemented the SHAC standard errors in our long
difference specification, ignoring uncertainty from the first stage. Additional ro-
bustness checks show that ignoring the uncertainty in the first stage has little
impact on the standard errors (see Online Appendix D.III and Table O.III).
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 across municipalities within the eligible border region or 54.4% of 
the variation across border and matched control municipalities.29
V.B. The Impact of Czech Inflows on Native Wages and
Employment
1. Aggregate Wage and Employment Effects. Figure IV pro-
vides a first visual assessment of the Czech inflow’s effect on the
local wages and employment of all native workers in the munici-
pality. These figures are based on our estimations of equations (7)
and (8), which regress municipality-level changes in native wages
or employment between two consecutive years on the Czech inflow
between 1990 and 1992 (except for 1991, which is based on the
1990–1991 inflow) instrumented by the municipality’s distance
to the border.30 We then plot the cumulative effects relative to
1990 by summing the estimated slope coefficients backward and
forward. The outcomes thus represent the cumulative wage (em-
ployment) effects of the Czech inflow between 1990 and 1992 for
each year between 1986 and 1995. We display the corresponding
cumulative post-policy regression coefficient in 1993 in row (i) of
Table IV (Panel A).
As the figures show, prior to 1990, the estimated coefficients
for both employment and wages are small and statistically not
significantly different from zero, meaning that distance to border
does not help to predict local employment and wage trajectories
in the prepolicy period (see also Online Appendix Table O.I). We
thus cannot reject the falsification test described in Section IV.B.
After the policy comes into effect in 1990, however, local wages—
and in particular local employment of native workers—drop sig-
nificantly. Whereas wages respond immediately, the employment
effect builds up and employment continues to decline from 1992 to
1993, although the employment share of Czech workers reaches
its peak in 1992. By 1993, a 1 percentage point increase in the
29. We have estimated a variety of alternative first stages based on different
functional form assumptions (i.e., a third order polynomial and a spline function in
distance to border) and different distance measures (driving distance and driving
time). These alternative specifications yield very similar first stage and 2SLS
estimates (see Online Appendix D.II and Table O.II).
30. In Online Appendix D.VII and Table O.V we report separate estimates
by gender, while in Online Appendix D.VIII and Table O.VI we instead consider
specifications that include the skill-specific change in the employment share of
Czech workers. As also discussed in Section IV.A, such specifications identify only
the relative effects of immigration.
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TABLE IV
WAGE AND EMPLOYMENT BASELINE ESTIMATES BY SKILL, 1990–1993
Wages Employment
Panel A: All
(i) 2SLS −0.134 −0.926
(0.047) (0.251)
(ii) OLS −0.058 −0.263
(0.038) (0.184)
Panel B: Unskilled
(i) 2SLS −0.202 −1.371
(0.048) (0.395)
(ii) OLS −0.094 −0.789
(0.041) (0.215)
Panel C: Skilled
(i) 2SLS −0.106 −0.501
(0.051) (0.214)
(ii) OLS −0.054 0.049
(0.025) (0.196)
No. municipalities 1,550 1,550
Note. The table reports 2SLS (rows (i)) and OLS (rows (ii)) estimates for the impact of the inflow of Czech
commuters into the municipality, measured as the increase in the number of Czech workers between 1990 and
1992 as of employment in 1990, on native local wage and employment growth in the aggregate (Panel a) and
for unskilled and skilled natives (Panels b and c). In rows (i), the inflow of Czech workers is instrumented with
a quadratic in the municipality’s airline distance to the nearest border crossing. Regressions are estimated
at the yearly level, across up to N = 1,550 municipalities, and coefficients are added up to obtain cumulative
effects. Tomake sure that thewage effects are not underestimated because of worker selection, the yearly wage
growth regressions are restricted to workers who remain employed in the district between two consecutive
years. While the first stage regression is weighted by total native employment in the municipality in 1990,
the second stage regression is weighted by group-specific native employment in the respective base year.
Standard errors are bootstrapped, using 500 replications, allowing for clustering on the district level.
Data Source: German Social Security Records, border region and matched control districts, 1990 to 1993.
inflow of Czech workers relative to employment in the baseline
has led to about a 0.13% decrease in native wages, a 0.93% de-
crease in native local employment, and a 0.07 (1–0.93) percent
increase in total (including Czech) local employment. Putting the
wage response into perspective, the real wage growth over the
period considered of workers employed in the two consecutive pe-
riods was about 3% per year, meaning that the negative wage
effects do not necessarily imply a decline in natives’ real wages.
Interpreted within the simple model laid out in Section II,
these negative overall wage and employment effects suggest that
at least in the short run, the local supply of capital is not fully
elastic.31 The large employment response, coupled with a smaller
31. We report evidence on firm entry in the tradable and nontradable sectors
in Online Appendix D.VI and Table O.IV.
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wage response, could either be driven by a high local labor supply
elasticity or by wages being partially downward rigid in the short
run, or both. Our estimates further imply a wage elasticity (ϕ =
− αλ1−α+λ in our model) of 0.54 (0.070.13 ), which is well within the range
of existing estimates ranging from 0.15 to 0.75 (e.g., Hamermesh
1993; Lichter, Peichl, and Siegloch 2015).
2. Wage and Employment Effects by Skill Group. According
to Table II, a higher fraction of Czech commuters was unskilled
relative to natives. We would therefore expect the overall inflow
of Czechs to depress local wages and employment of native
unskilled workers by more than those of native skilled workers,
unless the two groups differ in their wage rigidity or supply
elasticity; see equations (2), (4) and (5). We indeed find that both
the wages and employment of native unskilled workers do decline
relative to native skilled workers (see Table IV, Panels b and c).
Over the 1990–1993 period, a 1 percentage point increase in the
employment share of Czech workers decreases the local wages
and employment of unskilled natives by 0.20 and 1.37%, respec-
tively, but of skilled natives by only 0.11 and 0.50%. Rows (ii) of
Table IV reports simple OLS estimates that do not instrument
the share of Czech workers by distance to the border. Here, the
estimated wage and employment effects are smaller than the IV
estimates, particularly for skilled workers. This outcome is to
be expected if Czech workers predominantly entered mu-
nicipalities experiencing higher employment and wage
growth.
As an alternative measure for skill, we use individuals’ oc-
cupation (see Figure V). Specifically, we estimate our baseline
specification separately for nine 1-digit occupations and plot the
resulting 2SLS cumulative (1990 to 1993) wage (Panel a) and
employment (Panel b) coefficients in an occupation against the
occupation’s exposure to the labor supply shock, measured as the
employment share of Czech commuters in the occupation in 1992
divided by the average share. The figure clearly demonstrates
that local wages and employment of natives declined more in oc-
cupations with a larger exposure to Czech workers. Similarly, em-
ployment of native workers declines more strongly in industries
that experienced a larger inflow of Czech workers (see Online Ap-
pendix D.V and Figure O.II).
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TABLE V
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Border Inner border Long
Trend- region region vs. difference,
Baseline adjusted only inland SHAC s.e.
Panel A: Wage effects
All −0.134 −0.209 −0.134 −0.142 0.002
(0.047) (0.056) (0.096) (0.050) (0.053)
Unskilled −0.202 −0.282 −0.303 −0.205 −0.057
(0.048) (0.068) (0.105) (0.051) (0.080)
Skilled −0.106 −0.190 −0.093 −0.114 −0.052
(0.051) (0.060) (0.098) (0.054) (0.050)
Panel B: Employment effects
All −0.926 −0.927 −0.952 −0.897 −0.930
(0.251) (0.311) (0.456) (0.275) (0.243)
Unskilled −1.371 −1.417 −1.036 −1.368 −1.203
(0.395) (0.411) (0.522) (0.382) (0.271)
Skilled −0.501 −0.866 −0.586 −0.507 −0.522
(0.214) (0.313) (0.450) (0.236) (0.230)
No. municipalities 1,550 1,550 291 1,405 1,550
Note.The table presents coefficient estimates from various robustness tests. Column (1) reports our baseline
estimates (see Table IV, rows (i)). Column (2) allows for linear municipality-specific time trends in pooled
regressions, in which the pretreatment observations in 1987-1989 identify municipality-specific differences
in trend. Column (3) drops matched control districts from the sample and uses variation in the inflow of
Czechs across municipalities within the border region only. Column (4) compares the highly affected Eastern
(“inner”) part of the border region to unaffected matched control districts. In column (5), we report estimates
for which we take long differences (between 1990 and 1993) and average log wages over all workers who are
in employment in either of the two years, rather than over workers who remain employed in two consecutive
years, as in our baseline specification in column (1). In columns (1) to (4), standard errors are bootstrapped,
using 500 replications, allowing for clustering on the district level. Column (5) displays instead standard error
estimates based upon spatial HAC technique of Conley (1999), using a uniform kernel and bandwidth of 100
kilometers.
Data Source: German Social Security Records, border region and matched control districts, 1987 to 1993.
V.C. Robustness Checks
1. Common Time Trend and Sample Selection. The findings
in Table IV are robust to a number of specification checks, re-
ported in Table V and using the 2SLS estimates from Table IV
(row (i)), as a reference point. In column (2), we account for pos-
sible municipality-specific time trends, identified based on 1987–
1989 data, and report trend-adjusted estimates. The employment
estimates are similar to those reported in column (1), while the
wage estimates are larger in magnitude. In column (3), we drop
all control districts and compare only differentially exposed areas
within the border region, whereas in column (4) we compare the
region very close to the Czech-German border—which we refer
to from now on as the “inner border region” and which, because
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of shorter distance to the border, received the vast majority of
Czech inflows—with unaffected control areas.32 In both cases, the
results are very similar to those for our baseline estimates, in-
dicating that our findings are not dependent on the particular
matching of control districts, and providing indirect support for
our identifying assumption (discussed in Section IV.B).
2. Worker Selection. Column (5) of Table V reports the re-
sults of estimating equations (7) and (8) in long differences; that
is, regressing local wage and employment growth between 1990
and 1993 on Czech inflows between 1990 and 1992 rather than
estimating annual regressions and summing the coefficients as
in column (1). In these calculations, as is common in studies us-
ing repeated cross-sectional data, (log) wages are averaged over
all workers who are employed in any of the two years, 1990 and
1993, rather than over workers who remain employed in the dis-
trict in two consecutive years as in our baseline specification. As
expected, the employment effect estimates are barely affected and
remain very similar to those in the first column.33
These calculations do, however, highlight the importance of
how wages are measured. The results of the long difference esti-
mations point to no significant wage effects of the Czech inflow for
either skill group. This finding suggests that the workforce compo-
sition changes as a result of the labor supply shock, with low-wage
workersmore likely to leave or not enter the workforce in response
to immigration. Hence, a simple comparison of average wages
before and after the migration-induced supply shock underesti-
mates the wage effect on the remaining workers, meaning that if
immigration leads to selective employment effects, estimations
based on repeated cross sections some years apart may underes-
timate, or even fail to detect, adverse wage effects.
32. We split municipalities within the border region according to their fitted
values from the first stage regression. The inner border region is comprised of
145 municipalities in which the predicted inflow of Czech was above the median,
averaging to about 5.8% of total employment.
33. The small difference arises for two reasons: First, the baseline specifica-
tion weights the annual regressions by group-specific employment in t-1, which
changes slightly from year to year, while the long difference regression references
only 1990. Second, the sum of annual employment growth rates (
LNjt−LNjt−1
LNjt−1
) does
not correspond exactly to the employment growth rate over three time periods
(
LNjt−LNjt−3
LNjt−3
).
32
3. Synthetic Control Approach. An alternative estimation
strategy, the synthetic control approach, discards the variation
in municipalities’ exposure to Czech commuters induced by dis-
tance to the Czech-German border, and instead compares wages
and employment of the entire (inner) border region with those
in the matched control districts. It thus internalizes all employ-
ment movements across municipalities within the border region.
To obtain sharper results, we compare the evolution of aggregate
native employment and wages in the highly exposed inner border
region (treatment unit) with that in unexposed control districts
(synthetic control units). Figure VI displays the evolution of the
native wage (Panel a) and employment (Panel b) gaps between
the inner border region and its synthetic control (bold line). As
the figure shows, whereas both native wages and employment un-
fold in almost the same way in the treatment and control units
prior to the policy (recalling that in contrast to Figure IV, we are
now explicitly matching on trends), in 1991 a gap begins to emerge
in the treatment area relative to the control areas. To assess the
statistical significance of this divergence, the figure also displays
permutation tests in which we apply the synthetic control method
to every potential control in our sample (as in Abadie, Diamond,
and Hainmueller 2010). The results show that the employment
but not the wage gap is exceptionally large in the treated inner
border region compared to placebo districts, indicating statisti-
cal significance of the employment but not the wage gap. It is
not surprising that outcomes from the synthetic control approach
are more noisily estimated than our baseline estimates, as this
approach discards any variation in the inflow of Czech workers
within the inner border region.
To compare these outcomes with our estimates for the im-
pact of the inflow of Czech workers on native local wage and
employment growth, we must scale the wage and employment
gaps (−0.007 and −0.079 by 1993) by the share of Czech workers
that entered the treatment region (5.8%). The results, −0.12 for
wages, and −1.36 for employment, are roughly in the same ball-
park as our baseline coefficients of −0.13 and −0.93 in row (i) of
Table IV (Panel a). Estimates by skill group, reported in Online
Appendix D.IV and Figure O.I, are likewise similar. Hence, the
inflow of Czech workers into the inner border area led to an over-
all decline in native employment in that region and not merely to
employment shifts across municipalities within the region.
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TABLE VI
EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE EFFECTS BY SKILL AND AGE GROUPS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unadjusted Trend-adjusted
Wages Employment Wages Employment
Panel A: All
Below 30 −0.316 −0.832 −0.305 −0.604
(Share Czechs: 0.031) (0.086) (0.317) (0.079) (0.373)
30 to 49 −0.100 −0.534 −0.147 −0.964
(Share Czechs: 0.040) (0.050) (0.238) (0.058) (0.338)
50 and above −0.068 −1.945 −0.172 −1.428
(Share Czechs: 0.007) (0.046) (0.340) (0.055) (0.394)
Panel B: Unskilled
Below 30 −0.558 −2.262 −0.441 −1.601
(Share Czechs: 0.112) (0.107) (0.585) (0.103) (0.549)
30 to 49 −0.179 −0.704 −0.237 −1.428
(Share Czechs: 0.107) (0.064) (0.428) (0.078) (0.501)
50 and above −0.097 −1.364 −0.194 −1.324
(Share Czechs: 0.011) (0.053) (0.342) (0.080) (0.470)
Panel C: Skilled
Below 30 −0.276 −0.283 −0.281 −0.457
(Share Czechs: 0.017) (0.092) (0.319) (0.081) (0.378)
30 to 49 −0.090 −0.191 −0.142 −1.012
(Share Czechs: 0.025) (0.058) (0.197) (0.063) (0.329)
50 and above −0.066 −1.636 −0.158 −1.337
(Share Czechs: 0.005) (0.053) (0.275) (0.061) (0.383)
No. municipalities 1,550 1,550 1,550 1,550
Note. The table reports 2SLS estimates for the cumulative impact, between 1990 and 1993, of the inflow of
Czech commuters between 1990 and 1992 on local wage and employment growth of natives by age (Panel a)
and by age and skill (Panels b and c). Columns (1) and (2) report unadjusted estimates from regressions
estimated at the yearly level, where coefficients are added up to obtain cumulative effects. Columns (3) and
(4) report trend-adjusted estimates, obtained from a pooled regression over the years 1987 to 1993, in which
pretreatment observations in 1987–1989 identify differences in the linear municipality-specific time trend.
While the first stage regression is weighted by total native employment in themunicipality in 1990, the second
stage regression is weighted by group-specific native employment in the respective base year. Standard errors
are bootstrapped, using 500 replications, allowing for clustering at the district level.
Data Source: German Social Security Records, border region and matched inland control districts, 1987 to
1993.
V.D. Age Group-Specific Responses
In Table VI, we provide a more detailed analysis by investi-
gating whether the Czech inflow affects labor market outcomes
differently for younger (<30) and older (50) natives. The esti-
mates refer to our baseline specification, which links the overall
inflow of Czech workers to skill- and age-specific wage and em-
ployment growth (equations [7] and [8]) and captures the cumula-
tive effects up until 1993. We report two types of estimates: those
35
that are not trend adjusted (columns (1), (2)) and those that are
(columns (3), (4)).
The findings point toward perverse effects across age groups,
in particular for skilled workers. As Table I shows, in compar-
ison to natives, Czech workers were more concentrated in the
medium age range (30–49) than among young and older workers.
Thus, according to standard immigration models, which restrict
labor supply elasticities (or the degree of wage rigidity) to be the
same across age groups (and may allow for imperfect substitu-
tions), both employment andwages should decline themost for the
middle-aged within each skill group. The estimates in Table VI,
however, suggest that among skilled workers, young workers be-
low 30 suffer the largest wage loss of all three age groups, whereas
older workers aged 50 and above suffer the largest employment
losses. The pattern is similar among unskilled workers.
Our model provides two complementary explanations for this
pattern. First, older workers may be more elastic in their labor
supply than younger workers. This is plausible, as older workers
may have easier access to social security and unemployment ben-
efits than young workers—who in turn may be willing to accept
wage cuts at the beginning of their career to avoid scarring. Sec-
ond, wagesmay bemore downward rigid for older than for younger
workers as younger workers are typically on a steep wage growth
path whereas wages of older workers no longer grow (recall that
our wage analysis is restricted to workers who are employed in
two consecutive time periods). Thus, real wage cuts may be partic-
ularly visible and difficult to implement for older workers, while
for younger workers they imply lower growth than they otherwise
would have.
V.E. Margins of Adjustment
1. Inflows versus Outflows. The overall employment effect
reported above can be decomposed into workers who leave em-
ployment in a particular area (outflows) and workers who do not
enter employment but would have done so in the absence of the la-
bor supply shock (inflows), that is,
LNgt, j−LNgt−1, j
LNgt−1, j
= Inf low
N
g, j
LNgt−1, j
− Outf low
N
g, j
LNgt−1, j
,
where InflowNg is the number of natives employed in area j in year
t but not in year t-1, while Outf lowNg captures those natives who
were employed in t-1 but not in t. In Figure VIIwe report estimates
of the labor supply shock-induced impact on the inflow (Panel a)
36
and outflow (Panel b) rates using the same regressions as in
Figure IV, with the overall inflow and outflow rates as the depen-
dent variable. Unlike Figure IV, however, Figure VII represents
yearly rather than cumulative responses. The results indicate that
overall yearly employment effects are driven primarily by a reduc-
tion in inflows and to a far lesser extent by an increase in outflows.
Moreover, whereas the inflow response is immediate, the outflows
response is delayed and begins increasing only in 1991, one year
after the policy came into effect. This immediate response to in-
flows helps explain why native employment levels seem to react
so rapidly to local shocks.
Table VII provides detailed estimates using column (1) as the
reference for employment effects in the aggregate (Panel a) and
for different skill groups (Panel b) and age groups (Panel c).34
Columns (2) and (3) show the reduction in inflows and increase
in outflows, respectively, each of which makes up roughly 17%
of average employment over the 1985–1989 prepolicy period. All
table entries refer to the overall effect by 1993, and, as before,
are obtained by summing the coefficients from the annual regres-
sions. As Figure VII and the table entries indicate, inflows are
far more important than outflows for explaining the total employ-
ment response in all skill and age groups, accounting for at least
87% of the overall reduction in employment. The outflow margin
is largest for older workers, for whom outflows make up 28% of
the overall employment effect.
This finding puts a new spin on the usual interpretation of em-
ployment responses to labor supply shocks. In particular, rather
than implying that native workers lose their jobs as Czechs enter
the local labor market, the large employment response is induced
by workers not employed in the affected area (but possibly in
other areas) at the time of the policy no longer being hired. One
explanation for why the local employment decline is almost en-
tirely absorbed by reduced hiring as opposed to increased separa-
tions is that this group of “outsiders” is particularly elastic in their
34. Because inflow and outflow rates tend to be smaller in municipalities close
to the border, the overall employment estimates reported in Table VII, column
(1), are trend adjusted and differ slightly from our baseline estimates in Table IV.
Since a large NATO cold war military exercise (REFORGER 88) in the border
region in 1988 coincided with an unusually large outflow of workers from the
1987–1988 social security records who returned in 1989, we use only 1989 and
1990 to account for municipality-specific preexisting time trends rather than the
1987–1989 period used in Table V, column (2), and Table VI, columns (3) and (4).
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labor supply because they have outside alternatives (e.g., the abil-
ity tomove to an unaffected area). An alternative explanation (and
one in line with our arguments in Section II.B) is that, because
of private contractual arrangements or labor market regulations,
it is costly for firms to lay off their existing workforce. Firms can,
however, immediately adjust their hiring behavior. Whichever the
explanation, most of the burden of the employment effect is borne
by outsiders, whose strong labor supply response shields employed
or incumbent workers from the labor supply shock.35
2. Employment versus Nonemployment Movements. An-
other way to decompose the overall employment effect is to dis-
tinguish between movements from and to nonemployment (in-
cluding movements from and to unemployment) and movements
from and to employment in other areas.36 It should be noted that
this distinction differs from changes in residency (which are not
directly observed in our data), in that not all of the employment-
to-employment movements across areas, and some of our nonem-
ployment movements, may entail a change in residency.
We report the decomposition in columns (4) and (5) of
Table VII, defining a transition as an employment movement if
the worker is employed in one municipality in the base period and
in another municipality one year later. In terms of magnitude,
movement from and to nonemployment is far more relevant than
movement across areas: only about 17% (−0.168−0.989 ) of the overall em-
ployment effect results from direct employment movement to and
from other areas, with the remaining 83% stem from movement
into and out of nonemployment (see Panel a).
These entries, however, consider only direct movement in
which the worker was employed in two consecutive years in dif-
ferent municipalities. But workers might find employment in
another area only after a spell of nonemployment, meaning that
the numbers in column (5) could underestimate the extent of em-
ployment movements to other areas. To investigate this possibil-
ity, we categorize inflows from and outflows to nonemployment
35. A related point is made by Cadena and Kovak (2016).
36. That is,
LNgt−LNgt−1
LNgt−1
= In
E
g −OutEg
LNgt−1employment
+ In
NE
g −OutNEg
LNEgt−1non−employment
, where InEg are inflows
from employment in other areas, InNEg are inflows from nonemployment, Out
E
g are
outflows into employment in other areas and OutNEg are outflows into nonemploy-
ment.
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as an employment movement from or to another area if within
three years (as opposed to the previous or next year, as in col-
umn (5)) the worker is observed working in a different munici-
pality.37 This redefinition increases the estimated importance of
geographic movement, which now rises from 17% (column (5)) to
close to 29% (column (6)) of the overall employment effect. Inter-
estingly, a further decomposition of employment movements into
inflows and outflows shows that most employment movements
are driven by a reduction in inflows, with outflows to employment
in other areas being negligible (see Table VIII). Thus, while we
do find employment movements to other areas in response to the
labor supply shock, our results also indicate that these are not
induced by individuals in affected areas seeking employment in
unaffected areas (as usually suggested in the literature, see Peri
and Sparber 2011 for a review), but by individuals not seeking em-
ployment in affected areas. Spatial arbitrage in response to local
shocks may thus be achieved through a reduction rather than an
increase in geographical mobility (if individuals who would have
found employment in the affected area if the shock had not hap-
pened stay in their area instead). This pattern is consistent with
recent evidence on internal migration rates in the U.S. during the
Great Recession (see Monras 2015b).
Finally, in column (7) of Table VII, we directly investigate
how the municipality’s population responds to the Czech inflow
using population counts from Germany’s Federal Statistical Of-
fice. These data are informative about changes in residency in
response to an immigration-induced labor supply shock, rather
than about employment in other areas analyzed so far, albeit not
broken down by age or skill. The results indicate that a 1 percent-
age point increase in the employment share of Czech commuters—
who do not live in the affected German border region—decreases
local population levels by 0.3%. Thus, the estimation of the em-
ployment effects would have been roughly 30% smaller if, as
in much of the extant literature, we had measured them as
changes in the employment-to-population ratio. Using the change
in employment-to-population ratio in the municipality as our
dependent variable, we obtain a coefficient of –0.611 (as opposed
to −0.926 in our baseline specification), with a standard error
of 0.217.
37. Even if we increase the time window to five years, the numbers are similar.
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3. Employment versus Nonemployment Movement by Skill
and Age. The relative importance of employment movements
across areas differs markedly between skill and age groups.
Whereas for unskilled workers, the entire employment effect is
due tomovement into and out of nonemployment, for skilled work-
ers, between 25% and 37% of the overall employment response
involves employment movement across areas. This mirrors the
larger geographical mobility rates for skilled than unskilled work-
ers observed in our (see Panel b of Table VII) and other data (see,
e.g., Amior 2015). Differentiating between age groups in Panel c of
Table VII indicates that employment movements across areas are
relatively more important for workers under 30 who experience
the smallest absolute employment effect (27%, −0.147−0.555 , columns (4)
and (5)). For workers over 50, in contrast, for whom the absolute
employment effect is largest, nearly all the labor supply shock is
absorbed through transitions into and out of nonemployment—as
we would expect if older workers are entitled to generous un-
employment benefits and can take advantage of early retirement
packages.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Exploiting a commuting policy that created a sharp, sud-
den, and unexpected inflow of Czech workers to areas along the
German-Czech border, we assess the impact of an immigration-
induced labor supply shock on native wages and employment and
identify response dynamics in the policy’s immediate aftermath.
Our results show that on average, the labor supply shock led to
a moderate decline in local wages and a sharp decline in local
employment—an effect that is nearly entirely accounted for by a
reduction in hiring, and not by an increase in separations. This
observation indicates that “outsiders” (in particular, nonemployed
workers) bear most of the burden of the labor supply shock and
thus shield “insiders” (i.e., workers employed in the affected area)
from the adverse effects of the immigration-induced labor supply
shock.
Interestingly, the overall patterns of adjustment to the
immigration-induced labor supply shock documented in this
paper closely mirror the labor market adjustments in a recession:
The business cycle literature highlights that in a recession wages
in ongoing jobs are relatively sticky whereas employment drops
sharply, which—just like in our case—is mostly accounted for by
44
reduced hiring and not by increased separations (e.g., Hall 2005;
Shimer 2005; Rogerson and Shimer 2011; Shimer 2012). This sug-
gests our findings have implications beyond the immigration lit-
erature and generally help us to better understand how labor
markets respond to shocks.
It is important to emphasize that we focus on the short-term
effects of an immigration-induced labor supply shock, which may
be more pronounced than the longer-term effects typically con-
sidered in the literature. For instance, wages may be partially
downward rigid in the short but not in the longer term, while
the supply of capital may be more responsive—especially if, as in
our case, the inflow of immigrants was unexpected. In the longer
term, firms and workers could also respond to an immigration-
induced labor supply shock along other dimensions not consid-
ered here. For instance, firms might change their technology (see,
e.g., Lewis 2011), labor market entrants might invest more in full-
time education (see, e.g., Hunt 2012 and Smith 2012), and even
experienced workers might upgrade to more skilled occupations
(Peri and Sparber 2009). However, the short-term responses that
we investigate here shape agents’ incentives to undertake such
investments, and are therefore crucial to understand and assess
the mechanisms behind any longer-term adjustment.
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